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Abstract
We revisit the debate on the optimal number o rms in the com-
mons in a di¤erential oligopoly game in which rms are either quantity-
or price-setting agents. Production exploits a natural resource and
involves a negative externality. We calculate the number of rms max-
imising industry prots, nding that it is larger in the Cournot case.
While industry structure is always ine¤cient under Bertrand behav-
iour, it may or may not be so under Cournot behaviour, depending on
parameter values. The comparison of private industry optima reveals
that the Cournot steady state welfare level exceeds the corresponding
Bertrand magnitude if the weight of the stock of pollution is large
enough.
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1 Introduction
The usual approach to the economics of the environment treats externalities
and the extraction of natural resources separately, and in the latter case com-
pares open access (or equivalently, perfect competition) against monopoly.1
Here we propose a unied approach to the two aspects of the industrial ex-
ploitation of the environmen, using a homogeneous good oligopoly in which
rms may set either quantities or prices to maximise prots, and their produc-
tive activities require the use of a renewable resource and emit pollutants.
Each of these two aspects has indeed received attention in the literature,
either in static or in dynamic oligopoly models,2 but, to the best of our
knowledge, the joint analysis of resource extraction and pollution has not.
Our analysis will abstract from the possibility of regulating rms interac-
tion via Pigouvian taxation/subsidization3 and/or pollution rights,4 to focus
on the issue of the optimal number of rms in the commons. This prob-
lem lies at the intersection between the well known discussion about the
tragedy of the commons (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968) and the standard ap-
proach to the entry process belonging to the theory of industrial organization
(Novshek, 1980; Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987; Mankiw and Whinston, 1990).
The backbone of this discussion is the fact that, while in absence of any
external e¤ects increasing competition (and therefore industry output) in-
creases welfare, if industrial activities exploit natural resources and/or imply
the emission of pollutants then the socially optimal degree of concentration
of such an industry is determined by the balance between the price e¤ect
and the environmental one (Cornes and Sandler, 1983; Cornes, Mason and
Sandler, 1986; Karp, 1992; Mason and Polasky, 1997). We revisit this is-
sue in a di¤erential game in which we assess the privately optimal structure
(maximising industry prots) against the socially optimal industry structure
(maximising social welfare), given the prot-maximising behaviour of rms,
under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Industry structure is always
socially ine¢ cient under Bertrand behaviour, while it may or may not be so
under Cournot behaviour, depending on the environments e¢ ciency in ab-
1See Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Kemp and Long (1980), Pearce and Turner (1989),
Tisdell (2009) and Anderson (2010), inter alia.
2The related literature is too large to be cited entirely. See, inter alia, McMillan and
Sinn (1984), Sinn (1984), Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) and Fujiwara (2009).
3See Karp and Livernois (1992) and Benchekroun and Long (1998, 2002).
4See von der Fehr (1993) and Sunnevåg (2003).
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sorbing pollution. Then, we establish that (i) the privately optimal structure
in Cournot exceeds its counterpart in Bertrand, and consequently (ii) social
welfare in the private optimum can be higher at the Cournot equilibrium, if
the weight of pollution in the social welfare function is su¢ ciently high.
The basic model is laid out in section 2. The non-cooperative equilibrium
between prot-maximizing rms is outlined in section 3. Section 4 contains
the analysis of the social planning equilibrium. The two regimes are com-
paratively assessed in section 5, while the mixed setting is investigated in
section 6. Concluding remarks are in section 7.
2 The setup
Consider an oligopoly market over an innite (continuous) time horizon,
t 2 [0;1) ; in which n  2 rms supply a homogeneous good, whose market
demand function is
p (t) = a Q (t) (1)
at any time t 2 [0;1) ; with a > 0 being a positive constant parameter
measuring the reservation price and Q (t) =
Pn
i=1 qi (t) being the sum of all
rmsoutput levels. Production takes place at decreasing returns to scale,
with the same technology being common to all rms alike, so that rm is
instantaneous cost function is Ci (t) = cq2i (t) ; with the constant c > 0.
5
The production of the nal output goes along with a negative environmental
externality whose instantaneous level is (t) = S2 (t) =2; with  > 0 and
S (t) evolving over time according to the following dynamics:
dS (t)
dt


S (t) = bQ (t)  S (t) (2)
where  > 0 is the decay rate of the stock and b is a positive constant.
The Instantaneous consumer surplus CS (t) is measured by the area below
the demand function and above market price p (t) ; minus the externality
(t):
CS (t) =
Q2 (t)
2
  S
2 (t)
2
: (3)
5We could have specied the cost function as Ci (t) = zqi (t)+ cq2i (t) ; with z > 0: This
would be a useless complication, however, as one could as well think of the vertical intercept
of the demand function as a = ba   z; whereby the ensuing analysis would reproduce
unmodied.
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It is worth noting that a contraction of output has ambiguous consequences
over consumer surplus, due to the presence of a negative externality pro-
portional to the output: on the one hand, shrinking output goes along with
increasing market price, which is harmful; on the other hand, it entails reduc-
ing the environmental externality, which is desirable. The balance between
these components will play a key role in the remainder of the analysis.
Additionally, the production of the nal good makes use of a renewable
natural resource whose stock X (t) follows the state equation:
dX (t)
dt


X (t) = X (t)  vQ (t) ; (4)
with constants  and v strictly positive.
The instantaneous social welfare function, dened as the sum of industry
prots and consumer surplus, writes as follows:
SW (t) =
nX
i=1
i (t) +
Q2 (t)
2
(5)
 S
2 (t)
2
+X (t)
where i (t) = [p (t)  c] qi (t) is rm is instantaneous prot function.
In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the non-cooperative unreg-
ulated open-loop game where rms compete either à la Cournot-Nash or à la
Bertrand, alternatively, to maximise individual prots. In both cases, rm
i chooses its strategy (either quantity or price) to maximise the discounted
individual prot ow:
Ji (t) =
Z 1
0
i (t) e
 tdt (6)
s.t. the state equations (2) and (4), and the initial conditions S (0) = S0 and
X (0) = X0: Parameter  > 0 represents the constant discount rate common
to all rms in the industry.
3 The Cournot-Nash game
Here we characterise the open-loop equilibrium of the rst game, where all
rms are private and compete à la Cournot-Nash to maximise individual
prots. Our rst objective is to prove the following claim:
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Proposition 1. The game among prot-maximising rms is a linear state
one, and therefore its open-loop Cournot-Nash solution is strongly time con-
sistent.
Proof. The current value Hamiltonian of rm i is:
Hi (t) = i (t) + i (t)

S (t) + i (t)

X (t) (7)
where i (t) and i (t) are the co-state variables associated with the dynamics
of pollution and the natural resource, respectively.
The following system illustrates the set of rst order conditions on controls
and the associated co-state equations (omitting henceforth the time argument
for brevity):
@Hi
@qi
= a  2 (1 + c) qi  Q i + bi   vi = 0 (8)
 @Hi
@S
=

i   i ,

i = (+ )i (9)
 @Hi
@X
=

i   i ,

i = (+ )i (10)
where Q i 
P
j 6=i qj is the amount of instantaneous output collectively
supplied by all rivals of rm i at any given time. Clearly, (8-10) jointly
imply that the optimal output of rm i never depends on the states. The
intuitive reason is that rms - being unregulated prot maximising entities -
are completely uninterested in the amount of pollution and the stock of the
resource and consequently behave as if the two-sided tragedy of commons
did not exist. From a strictly technical standpoint, one can easily check that
@2Hi
@qi@S
=
@2Hi
@S2
= 0 (11)
as well as
@2Hi
@qi@X
=
@2Hi
@X2
= 0 (12)
and therefore the game is indeed a linear state one (cf. Dockner et al.,
2000, p. 188), yielding a subgame perfect or strongly time consistent Nash
equilibrium under the open-loop information structure.
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Accordingly, from (10) one obtains i = 0 for all i = 1; 2; 3; :::N at any
time during the game. Then, from (8), one nds
i =
2 (1 + c) qi +Q i   a
b
: (13)
Then, di¤erentiating w.r.t. time, imposing symmetry across quantities (qj =
qi = q for all i; j) and using (9), the control equation obtains:

q =
(+ ) [q (n+ 1 + 2c)  a]
2c+ n+ 1
: (14)
Imposing stationarity, we have qCN = a= (n+ 1 + 2c) ; which coincides with
the solution of the static game. Superscript CN stands for Cournot-Nash. Of
course the same solution obtains immediately by observing that the system
of co-state equations (9-10) admits the solution i = i = 0 for all i =
1; 2; 3; :::N at all times, whereby the rst order condition (8) indeed delivers
qCN = a= (n+ 1 + 2c) throughout the game.6
Before proceeding any further, we briey evaluate the stability properties
of the dynamic system (2-4-14), by looking at the associated Jacobian matrix:
J =
2666666664
@

S
@S
@

S
@X
@

S
@q
@

X
@S
@

X
@X
@

X
@q
@

q
@S
@

q
@X
@

q
@q
3777777775
(15)
that is,
J =
24   0 bN0   vN
0 0 + 
35 (16)
whose eigenvalues are
1 =   < 0; 2 =  > 0; 3 = +  > 0: (17)
6This also implies that i = 0 for all i throughout the game, as is easily veried from
(13). Thus, the transversality conditions
lim
t!1iS = limt!1iX = 0
are trivially satised for all i:
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Accordingly, we can state:
Proposition 2. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the open-loop game is
a saddle point.
The corresponding amount of pollution and the residual volume of natural
resource obtain, respectively, from

S = 0 and

X = 0:7
SCN =
nab
(2c+ n+ 1) 
; (18)
XCN =
nav
(2c+ n+ 1) 
: (19)
From the above expressions we can draw:
Lemma 3. Since
lim
n!1
SCN =
ab

; lim
n!1
XCN =
av

;
open access implies positive and nite volumes of resource and pollution at
the steady state.
In particular, the second of the above limits reveals that open access does
not lead to resource extinction.
The per-rm prots and social welfare in steady state are
CN =
a2 (1 + c)
(2c+ n+ 1)2
; (20)
SWCN =
na
2 (2c+ n+ 1)2 2
(21)
with
  a (n+ 2 (1 + c)) 2   nb2 
+2v (2c+ n+ 1) 2: (22)
The above expression reveals the following result.
Lemma 4. The condition
 > b
r
n
n+ 2 (1 + c)
 CNSW
7Then, one can also easily show that the feedback equilibrium based upon the linear
value function Vi (S;X) = !1 + !2S + !3X and the corresponding Bellman equation
Vi (S;X) = maxqi [i + @Vi=@S  dS=dt+ @Vi=@X  dS=dt] is indeed
 
SCN ; XCN ; qCN

:
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su¢ ces to ensure that the steady state social welfare level of the Cournot
game be positive.
That is, if the rate of absorption of pollutants is high enough, then social
welfare cannot fall below zero. The critical threshold highlighted in Lemma
4 is clearly increasing in both b and ; i.e., the parameters measuring the
marginal contribution of industry output to the accumulation of pollution,
and the weight of the stock of pollutants in the composition of welfare.
4 The Bertrand-Nash game
Here we deal with the price competition case. The Hamiltonian of rm i
is dened as in (7), and as usual prot-seeking rms do not internalise the
external e¤ects of their strategies. Hence, also in the Bertrand case the open-
loop equilibrium will be strongly time consistent, and will replicate forever
the equilibrium of the static one-shot game. There remains to characterise
the equilibrium price behaviour of rms at the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
To perform this task, we will rely on Dastidar (1995), that has established
what follows.
According to Dastidar (1995), if the cost function (common to all rms)
features decreasing returns to scale, as is the case in the present model, then
the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is necessarily non-unique. In particular, the
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is characterised by both rms setting the
same price pBN , which is bounded by two thresholds, pavc  pBN  pu: The
lower bound pavc (as the superscript indicates) equals average variable costs,
so that at pavc rms will be indi¤erent between either producing the output
solving
pavc = a  nq (23)
or producing nothing at all. The upper bound pu (with superscript u standing
for undercutting) is the price at which rms are indi¤erent between choosing
price pu, and marginally undercutting it in order to capture the entire market
demand at pu.
The value of pavc is given by solving (23) w.r.t. q:
cq = a  nq (24)
which delivers q = a= (c+ n) and then substituting the latter into the demand
function to obtain:
pavc =
ac
c+ n
: (25)
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The upper bound to the equilibrium price, pu; obtains by imposing indi¤er-
ence between the symmetric oligopoly prots:
O = (a  nq) q   cq2 (26)
and the monopoly prots generated by undercutting:
M = n

(a  nq) q   cnq2 : (27)
Imposing O = M we obtain the following:
q =
a
c (n+ 1) + n
(28)
which can be plugged into the demand function to identify
pu =
a (n+ 1) c
c (n+ 1) + n
: (29)
As a matter of curiosity, one can equate the inverse demand function to
marginal cost, then solve for q and nally substitute the resulting output
back into the demand function, to obtain marginal cost pricing:
pmc =
2ac
2c+ n
; (30)
where, obviously, superscript mc stands for marginal cost pricing.
The continuum of Nash equilibria can be represented by the following
expression:
pBN =
ac
c+ n  : (31)
Parameter  represents the relative intensity of price competition between
rms. Note that, when  = 0; the equilibrium price pBN equals average vari-
able cost;  = 1 corresponds to the case in which price equals marginal cost,
while at  = 4=3 the price attains the highest level above which undercutting
takes place. As a consequence, we impose the restriction  2 [0; 4=3] : Using
(31), the individual output and prots write, respectively, as follows:
qBN =
a (n  )
n (c+ n  ) (32)
BN =
a2c (n  )
n2 (c+ n  )2 : (33)
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Using (32), we can solve

S = 0 and

X = 0 to obtain the steady state
levels of pollution and the natural resource:
SBN =
a (n  ) b
(c+ n  )  ; (34)
XBN =
a (n  ) v
(c+ n  )  : (35)
It is worth noting that the limits of SBN and XBN coincide with those of the
corresponding magnitudes generated by Cournot behaviour.8
The associated level of social welfare is:
SWCN =
a (n  ) 
2n (c+ n  )2 2 (36)
with
  2nv (c+ n  ) 2+ (37)


n (n  )  2   b2+ 2c2 :
The above expression immediately shows the following.
Lemma 5. The condition
 > b
p
  BNSW
su¢ ces to ensure that the steady state social welfare level of the Bertrand
game be positive.
Since
n
n+ 2 (1 + c)
< 1 (38)
for all n  2 and c > 0; the threshold emerging from the Cournot game is
lower than the one characterising the Bertrand setting.
5 The second-best Industry structure
Here we focus on the issue of the optimal number of rms in the commons.
We set out by checking that the industry structure maximising industry
8Of course the steady state levels of resource and pollution do not coincide in general
across the two settings. A general appraisal of Cournot vs Bertrand is given in section 5.
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prots in the steady state of the Cournot model solves
@
 
nCN

@n
=
a2 (1 + c) (2c  n+ 1)
(2c+ n+ 1)3
= 0 (39)
in nCN = 2c + 1; so that n
CN
  2 for all c  1=2; otherwise nCN = 1 and
industry prots are maximised in monopoly. Suppose indeed c  1=2. If
so, we can assess the social (in)e¢ ciency of the privately optimal number of
rms nCN by substituting n
CN
 = 1 + 2c into the rst derivative of SW
CN
w.r.t. n; obtaining:
@SWCN
@n

nCN
/ (a + 2v) 2   ab2 ? 0 (40)
for all
 ? b
r
a
a + 2v
 CNn (41)
and the r.h.s. of (41) may be evaluated against the threshold CNSW appearing
in Lemma 4 at n = nCN = 1 + 2c:r
a
a + 2v
?
r
2c+ 1
3 + 4c
, a ? v (1 + 2c)
(1 + c) 
: (42)
Therefore we can formulate:
Proposition 6. Take a > v (1 + 2c) = [(1 + c) ] and   CNSW ; so that
SWCN  0: In this range, CNn > CNSW and
@SWCN
@n

nCN
< 08 2 CNSW ; CNn  ;
@SWCN
@n

nCN
 08  CNn :
In the alternative range a < v (1 + 2c) = [(1 + c) ] ; we have CNn < 
CN
SW and
consequently
@SWCN
@n

nCN
 08  CNSW :
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Now we turn our attention to the Bertrand case. Here, the number of
rms that maximises industry prots nBN solves
3n3   2 + 2 (2n+ c)    6n2 + c (4n+ c) = 0 (43)
delivering9
nBN =
3+
p
 (+ 8c)
4
 2 (44)
for all c  (4  ) (2  ) = > 1=2 for all  2 [0; 4=3] : Under this condition
(that excludes the trivial monopoly case and ensures n  2 irrespective of
the market variable being set), we can substitute nBN into the derivative of
SWBN w.r.t. n; nding
@SWBN
@n

nBN
/ a  2   b2
 + 2v ; (45)
with

  10c+ (2c+ 1)
p
 (+ 8c)   > 0; (46)
   4 (5+ 2c) c  2 + (+ 8c)
p
 (+ 8c) > 0: (47)
Since Lemma 5 establishes that  > BNSW = b
p
 in order for SWBN > 0; we
can state:
Proposition 7. Take c  (4  ) (2  ) = > 1=2, so that nBN  2.
@SWBN=@n

nBN
> 0 for all  > BNSW :
We may sum up this discussion in the following terms. Provided  is
large enough to ensure that social welfare is positive at the steady state of
both games, Propositions 6 and 7 jointly convey a message telling that, while
under quantity-setting behaviour the privately optimal number of rms may
be higher or lower than the socially optimal one, depending on market size
and the environments e¢ ciency in absorbing pollution, under price-setting
behaviour we have the unambiguous result that a benevolent planner would
like to enlarge the population of rms as compared to the privately optimal
industry structure. An explanation of this result is sketched in the next
section.
9The other solution to (43) can be excluded as it is negative for all  2 [0; 4=3] :
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6 Prices vs quantities
The comparative assessment of the two settings can be carried out along
several dimensions, the rst being the relative size of nCN vs n
BN
 : The ex-
pression nBN   nCN is concave in , and nBN = nCN in
c =
7  8p (17  16)
16
(48)
with c  < 0 for all  2 [16=17; 4=3] and c+  0 for all  2 [1; 4=3] : Yet, c+ <
(4  ) (2  ) = for all admissible values of ; and consequently nBN <
nCN except in the trivial case where both models only accomodate monopoly.
The fact that Cournot behaviour allows for a larger population of rms in
correspondence of maximum industry prots is denitely behind the result
emerged from Propositions 6-7 above.
Consider now output levels, given a generic number of rms. The di¤er-
ence:
qBN   qCN / n  + (n  2) c (49)
is surely positive (i) for any n  2; if  2 [0; 1] ; (ii) for any  2 [0; 4=3] ;
if n  3: Taking into account the integer problem and the constraint c 
(4  ) (2  ) = inherited from Proposition 7, the r.h.s. of (49) changes
sign in the region identied by n = 2 and  2 1;  9 p17 =4 ; in which
qBN ? qCN for all c 7 n  
2  n =
2  
2 (  1) : (50)
If instead  2   9 p17 =4; 4=3, we have
2  
2 (  1) >
(4  ) (2  )

(51)
and therefore qCN > qBN : Exactly the same conclusions apply for aggregate
industry output and therefore also for the steady state levels of pollution
and the natural resource, as the latter are, by the assumptions of the model,
linear in the industry output. Hence, we may conclude that, taking n 
2 as given (with the exception of the particular and circumscribed case
identied in (50)), pollution is lower under Bertrand competition than under
Cournot competition, due to the output restriction observed under price-
setting behaviour, which is generated by the presence of decreasing returns to
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scale. Exactly the opposite would intuitively apply if the marginal cost were
constant, as in such a case the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium would coincide
with perfect competition and consequently industry output would be higher
than the Cournot-Nash one, with obvious consequences on industry prots.
However, by the same token, consumer surplus and the steady state volume
of natural resource are both higher under Cournot competition than under
Bertrand competition.
A di¤erent exercise can be envisaged to compare the two industry output
given their respective optimal industry structures nCN and n
BN
 ; to evaluate
the di¤erence
Q = QBN

nBN
  QCN 
nCN
= (52)
+ 2c p (+ 8c)
4 (  c) ;
whose numerator is positive for all c >  (and conversely), so that Q < 0
everywhere.10 For the aforementioned reasons, this has in principle ambigu-
ous consequences on welfare. Hence we must evaluate
SW  WBN 
nBN
  WCN 
nCN
: (53)
In the special case  = 0 (i.e., under average cost pricing under Bertrand
behaviour), we have:
SW /   a  2   b2+ 2v2 (1 + 2c)  2cv2 < 0 (54)
for any  > b
p
: For any  2 (0; 4=3] ; we have instead:11
SW =  (a; b; c; v; ; ; )   (a; b; c; v; ; ; ) (55)
with  () ; () > 0; so that SW > 0 for all  >  () = (). Accordingly,
we may state:
Proposition 8. In correspondence of the optimal industry structure nKN ;
K = B;N , the steady state social welfare level is higher under Cournot
behaviour for all admissible levels of ; if average cost pricing prevails in
the Bertrand game. Otherwise, for positive values of ; steady state social
welfare is higher under Cournot competition if  is high enough.
10The possibility for Cournot to accomodate more rms (and therefore deliver a higher
output) than Bertrand has been highlighted in a static game by Cellini, Lambertini and
Ottaviano (2004).
11We omit the expressions  () and  () for brevity. These can be reconstructed from
the denition of SW in (53).
14
7 Conclusions
We have analysed a di¤erential oligopoly game in which environmental exter-
nalities and the exploitation of natural resources combine in a single frame-
work. Considering prices or quantities alternatively as the rmsstrategic
instruments, we have assessed the privately optimal number of rms against
the socially optimal one, showing the emergence of an ambiguous conclu-
sion in the Cournot setup. Conversely, under Bertrand behaviour the pri-
vately optimal degree of concentration is denitely too large from the social
standpoint. Relatedly, taking as a benchmark the privately optimal industry
structure, we have shown that the relative size of welfare levels at the steady
states of the two models depends on the capability of the environment to
absorb polluting emissions.
The foregoing analysis has been carried out assuming any form of regu-
lation away. The study of the interplay between environmental policy, rms
strategic behaviour and the (in)e¢ ciency of the resulting industry structure
in the commons is left for future research.
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